The Constitutional Framework
Limiting Compelled Voice Exemplars:
Exploration of the Current
Constitutional Boundaries of
Governmental Power Over a
Criminal Defendant*
"Bills of Rights give assurance to the individual of the
preservation of his liberty. They do not define the liberty
they promise. "1
"In a split decision, a three judge panel ruled that
Richard Olvera s constitutional rights were violated when
the trial judge ordered him to stand five feet from the jury
and utter the bank robbers command, 'Give me all of
your money' and, in Spanish, 'dame tu dinero. '"2
INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Olvera, the Ninth Circuit held that forcing Richard
Olvera to repeat phrases heard by a witness during a bank robbery, for
which Olvera was on trial, violated his guaranteed presumption of
innocence. 3 The Ninth Circuit attempted to explain how the particular
combination of facts and procedures in the Olvera case invoked
constitutional protection. The court justified its ruling against an

* I would like to give special thanks to Professor Cynthia Lee and Justice
Richard Huffman for their assistance on this Comment.
I. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, reprinted in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CORTEX 251, 311 (Margaret E. Hall ed.,
1947).
2. Jim Doyle, Judge's Order to Talk Leads to Reversal, S.F. CHRON., July 28,
1994, at A23.
3. 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994).
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adamant dissent and set its decision apart from other factually analogous
circuit court decisions. 4
Olvera is just one example of the ongoing difficulties courts face in
defining the constitutional boundaries of compelled evidence production
and, in particular, compelled voice exemplars. 5 The courts must grapple
with a number of constitutional and statutory issues, each of which
might prohibit a particular exemplar under a particular set of circumstances. In addition, courts must balance important policy considerations
applicable to compelled evidence situations. On the one hand, courts
must recognize the important governmental interest in protecting the
safety of the citizenry through conviction and incarceration of criminals,
and the need to rely on witness identification for this purpose. 6 On the
other hand, this interest must be tempered by the court's duty to protect
and preserve the individual liberties on which the United States was built
and continues to be based. 7
Unfortunately, treatment of voice exemplar issues by modern courts
seems to fall short of adequately protecting individual rights. The
problem, in large part, is a result of the formal application of constitutional standards, instead of considering the actual effect of a particular
state practice on individual rights. A trial court's decision to allow or
prohibit a compelled voice exemplar in a case is not merely a procedural
matter, and is potentially the most important decision the court makes in
a trial. 8 The court's decision is of tantamount importance because of
the particular effect that witness' identification testimony can have on
the jury, especially if the compelled speech mimics words used at a
crime scene. 9 The importance of the court's decision concerning an
exemplar becomes clearer still once the complete ramifications of a
court's decision to allow the exemplar are recognized.

4. See id.
5. A compelled voice exemplar is a particular word or series of words or phrases
uttered by a defendant against his will, by command of the court.
6. However, the Supreme Court has not given carte blanche to the state to use
witness identification testimony in all cases, noting that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
7. Id.; see also ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 80 (1955)
("This country was built on individual liberty. It will never be saved in the long run by
submerging individual rights in the quest for absolute safety for the state.").
8. See Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification,
12 WM. & MARYL. REV. 235,238 (1970) (faulty identifications may pose the "greatest
single threat to the achievement of our ideal that no innocent man shall be punished").
9. See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in
Connection with Pretrial Identification Procedures: an Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY.
L.J. 259,315 (1991).
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If a voice exemplar is determined to be merely evidence, versus a
constitutionally protected right, the defendant is placed between the
proverbial "rock and a hard place." At that point, the defendant may be
compelled by the state to give an exemplar mimicking any words the
government tells the defendant to repeat. 10 The government's preference seems to be to have the defendant repeat the words allegedly stated
during the commission of the alleged crime. These words tend to be
threatening or menacing in nature, and requiring a defendant to repeat
these words in court in front of the jury is conceivably the most
prejudicial method of establishing a voice identification possible. 11
Despite this, the defendant does not even have the right to diminish the
potential prejudice by offering a neutral 12 voice exemplar for identification purposes. 13 Even more troubling is the practice of allowing an
exemplar to be compelled, despite the fact that the relevant witness has
identified the defendant in court visually and has stated that a voice
exemplar is unnecessary. 14 Such a practice places into doubt the actual
reason for the compelled exemplar. Further, in all jurisdictions, the
defendant's failure to produce the exemplar will be admissible as

IO. See 2 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED§ 6.5, at
251-55 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994).
11. Having the defendant utter threatening and menacing words places an aura of
criminality around the defendant, strongly suggesting to the jury that the defendant is
guilty. "It is hard for me to conceive of a more prejudicial method of establishing a
voice identification." United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 107 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981).
12. Such a substitution cannot be made without court permission. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Hellmann, 756 F.2d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 1985). "Neutral" in this
context refers to the words spoken, not the manner in which they are spoken. For
example, a court might allow the defendant to read an article from a magazine in lieu
of restating the phrases spoken during the commission of the charged criminal activity.
The defendant's restating of menacing words in a non-threatening manner does not
overcome the prejudice. The use of such words acts to recreate the scene of the crime
in the minds of the jury and to put the defendant in that scene. The prejudice comes
from this effect, not the tone of voice.
13. Id. (grand jury has broad discretion to compel verbatim voice exemplar and
defendant's offer of a neutral exemplar does not constitute sufficient compliance).
14. State v. Locklear, 450 S.E.2d 516, 518 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (despite the
witness' statement that no voice exemplar was necessary, the trial court's demand that
the defendant provide an exemplar was still within its discretion); United States v.
Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 1987) (despite fact that witness had already identified
defendant, the forcing of the defendant to repeat words uttered during the commission
of the crime did not violate defendant's rights).
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probative evidence of consciousness of guilt, 15 even if the defendant
chooses to exercise her right to remain silent. 16
In contrast, the defendant is given no right to present a voice exemplar
as evidence, in the absence of the defendant's testimony, 17 unlike other
types of exemplar evidence which the defendant may offer without
submitting to cross-examination. 18 The formal basis for such an
inequity is that the defendant could easily fake a voice exemplar without
penalty, since the prosecution would have no opportunity to expose the
trickery through questioning. 19 However, the defendant is equally
capable of faking a state compelled exemplar without being subject to
cross-examination, a problem that has not yet been addressed by the
courts. Under the trickery logic, state compelled exemplars should
likewise be excluded.
Regardless, the disparate treatment of compelled exemplars ignores the
real impact that the isolated performance of the exemplar will have on
the trier of fact. The prosecution, by use of the state's judicial power,
is allowed to force the defendant to repeat words allegedly said during
a criminal activity, even if the defendant has exercised her constitutional
right to remain silent. The defendant has no right to substitute neutral
words or to use any other means to lessen the prejudice of this
procedure. Yet, if a defendant wishes to volunteer a voice exemplar for
witness identification purposes, she may do so only by abandoning her
right to remain silent and by submitting to full cross-examination. In
effect, the government is given all the benefits and none of the burdens,

15.

1 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET. AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS

§ 14.13, at 457-58 (4th ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994). While using the fact that a defendant

exercised a right against that defendant would be unconstitutional under Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), no such prohibition is applicable to exemplars as the
defendant has no constitutional right to refuse to provide one. South Dakota v. Neville,
459 U.S. 553, 560-61 (1983).
16. United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 35-36 (6th Cir.) (upholding instruction
that jurors could infer defendant's consciousness of guilt from his refusal to provide a
court ordered voice exemplar), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
17. People v. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d 728 (N.Y. 1988). In Scarola, the prosection
witness testified under cross-examination that the robber had no speech problems or
unique voice mannerisms. Id. at 730. The defendant, who had a profound speech
impediment, was nonetheless barred from offering a voice exemplar, unless he consented
to be subject to complete cross-examination. Id. at 731; see also United States v.
Esdaille, 769 F.2d 104, 107 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 (1985) (due process
does not require court to allow defendant with a heavy Caribbean accent to offer his
voice as evidence because of the suspect nature of the exemplar).
18. E.g., United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1985) (trial court erred in
refusing defendant's request to exhibit the tattoos on his hands to the jury after witness
testimony that witness did not recall any distinguishing features about bank robber's
hands).
19. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d at 733; Esdaille, 769 F.2d at 107-08.
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because the same evidence that is allowed the prosecution is denied to
the defense. 20
The only recourse left to the defendant is to request that the witness
be given multiple voice exemplars to choose from,21 in an attempt to
minimize the prejudice arising from the compulsion and the words used.
However, the defendant has no absolute right to this protection. 22 In
most cases, trial courts continuously refuse to allow any mitigating effort
by the defendant, 23 despite the minimal disruptive effect of allowing the
protection. 24
This Comment seeks to provide a comprehensive guide to the current
constitutional framework surrounding in-court compelled voice
exemplars. The express purpose is to explore the current framework of
United States jurisprudence concerning exemplars for use by legal
practitioners in the criminal field. Part I addresses the self-incrimination
privilege as applied to exemplars. Despite Supreme Court decisions that
radically limit the application of the self-incrimination privilege, selfincrimination continues to have particularized application in protecting
defendants from compelled evidence. More importantly, self-incrimination seems to be the most likely basis on which an exemplar would be
prohibited, a fact reflected by the solitary focus of scholarly research on
the privilege against self-incrimination when considering the constitution-

20. At least one court has recognized the implication of such disparate treatment,
holding that if the state could have ordered the defendant to speak without violating
constitutional guarantees, then principles of due process require that the defendant be
allowed to provide non-testimonial speech without exposing himself to cross-examination. State of Louisiana v. Tillett, 35 l So. 2d I I 53 (La. I 977).
2!. See, e.g., United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 938 (1982) (counsel may request court permission to seat multiple people at
defense table to test witness identification, but doing so without court's awareness may
constitute criminal contempt).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 903-04 (7th Cir. 1985)
(refusal of defendant's request for an in-court identification lineup was not an abuse of
discretion).
23. Id.; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Hellmann, 756 F.2d 428, 431 (6th Cir.
l 985) (grand jury refusal to accept a neutral voice exemplar was within its discretion);
United States v. Edward, 439 F.2d 150 (3rd Cir. 1971) (trial court's refusal of
defendant's request to sit among court spectators during testimony of identifying
witnesses was not an abuse of discretion).
24. See United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987).
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ality of compelled voice exemplars. 25 Additionally, defense counsel
continue to argue the applicability of the privilege to the prohibition of
exemplars. Thus, despite the current Supreme Court limitations on the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination to exemplars, a full
analysis of self-incrimination doctrine is essential to a complete analysis
of constitutional limitations on state compelled exemplars.
Part II of this Comment considers the due process limitations the
courts have applied to exemplars. Despite an ongoing dispute between
the circuits as to whether due process acts to limit compelled exemplar
situations, the Supreme Court has not yet provided guidance in this
constitutional area. As with self-incrimination analysis, the historical
foundations of due process are included because of their importance in
consideration of the current application of constitutional rights.
Finally, Part III will briefly consider other constitutional and
evidentiary limitations that have been argued, or might be argued, in the
context of exemplars. Even though none of these has yet received wide
recognition or support, each is worthy of consideration for its potential
application in certain contexts, and as part of a complete study of the
current constitutional boundaries of state compelled exemplars.
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION AS A PROTECTION AGAINST STATE COMPELLED
EVIDENCE AND EXEMPLARS

A.

History

The origin of the privilege against self-incrimination is seen in the
resistance against the judicial system of the Stuart monarchy, 26 which
occurred in the early to middle seventeenth century. In particular, the
notorious trial of John Lilburne,27 in which the defendant's adamant

25. See Russell J. Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, IO VAND. L. REV. 485 ( I957).
26. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 25, at 486-89; John H. Wigmore, The
Privilege Against Self-Crimination; Its History, 15 HARV. L. REV. 610, 624-26 (1902).
One of the most striking of the methods was the ex officio oath, utilized by the
ecclesiastical courts in pursuit of enemies of the Established Church. A judge, by virtue
of his office, had the authority to place a defendant under oath and proceed to interrogate
him. This system allowed the Church, on mere suspicion alone, to compel anyone to
provide proof against himself. DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY
304-05 (1976).
27. Lilbume was accused of importing subversive books from Holland and of
treason. Despite being jailed and severely beaten, he refused to take the oath. For a
detailed discussion, see Harold W. Wolfram, John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillar of Fire,
3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213 (1952).
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refusal to testify was ultimately recognized as legitimate by the court,
has been focused on as the judicial origin point of the right against selfincrimination. 28 From the resistance movements of the 1630's and
1640's, the privilege continued to be recognized in England up through
the Glorious Revolution period. 29
Overall, criminal procedure in the American colonies mirrored
criminal procedure under English common law, including the right
against compelled self-incrimination. 30 By the mid-eighteenth century,
the right was firmly established throughout the colonies. 31 In 1776, a
self-incrimination clause was included in the Virginia Bill of Rights, 32
followed by similar inclusion of clauses in many other state constitutions.33 Influenced by these examples, James Madison's drafting of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1789 included a
guarantee against being compelled to "be a witness" against oneself. 34
Recent historical studies of the privilege against self-incrimination
have provided new insight into the actual role of the privilege. 35 This
new approach recognizes the "tradition" of the privilege as addressed by

28. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION 301-13 (1968).
29. See id. at 301-13.
30. Id. at 371-76.
3 I. Id. at 368-404.
32. THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 1776, § 8, reprinted in THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909 (Benjamin P. Poore, 2d. 1878).
33. E.g., A DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776, art. IX, reprinted in Poore, supra note 32, at 1541-42;
CONSTITUTION OF MARYLAND, 1776, art. xx, reprinted in id. at 817-18; THE BILL OF
RIGHTS OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1780, art. XII, reprinted in id. at 958.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Madison's use of the phrase "be a witness" differed
from the terms used in the state constitutions at that time, phrases like "furnish
evidence," "secure evidence," or "compelled to give evidence." See, e.g., VIRGINIA BILL
OF RIGHTS, 1776, art. VIII., reprinted in Poore, supra note 32, at 1909; VERMONT
CONSTITUTION OF 1777, chap. I, art. X. Id. at 1860; MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION
OF 1780, art. XII. Id. at 958; DELAWARE CONSTITUTION OF 1792, § 7. Id. at 279. The
Supreme Court disregarded claims that the different wording was intended for a different
meaning, stating that the various state and federal provisions, "however differently
worded, should have as far as possible the same interpretation." Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 n.6 (1967) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 584-85 (1892)).
35. But see Richard H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination: The Role of the European !us Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990)
(theorizing that the true origin of the privilege against self-incrimination is found in a
blend of Roman and canon law).
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Wigmore and Levy, but argues that the existence of the privilege was in
form only. 36 The actual criminal procedure of common law England
and colonial America did not, as a practical matter, allow an individual
defendant to utilize the privilege. 37 Under English common law, the
defendant could not compel witnesses on his behalf, nor was the
defendant allowed the presence of counsel at the trial itself. 38 Likewise, many of the early colonial criminal procedural systems included
these same limitations. 39 Therefore, as a practical matter, defendants
had to speak in their own defense and respond to prosecutorial evidence
as it was given within this procedural system. 40 A defendant's failure
to speak in her own defense was tantamount to admitting unconditional
guilt, as the trier of fact would be provided with no foundation on which
to base a judgment of innocence. Thus, while the privilege against selfincrimination provided a formal procedural protection against governmental inquisitions,4 1 the notion of asserting the privilege individually

36. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994); Eben Moglen,
Taking the Fifih: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086 (1994).
37. The criminal procedure during this period has been categorized as the "accused
speaks" trial system. Langbein, supra note 36, at J054. This procedural system was
depicted by Sir Thomas Smith in De Repub/ica Ang/arum, within the framework of a
hypothetical trial circa 1565. THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM, bk. 2, ch. 23,
at 114 (1982) (1st ed. 1583). The trial depicts the defendant in a continuing confrontational dialogue with both the victim and the accusing witnesses. The defendant
immediately responds to each item of evidence as well as to the questions posed to him
by his accusers. Id.
38. This rule lasted until 1696 in cases of treason and until 1836 in cases of
felony. 7 & 8 Will. Ill, c.3 (1696); 6 & 7 Will. IV, c.114 (1836). At least one historian
has interpreted these limitations in a positive light instead of as limitations, extolling the
momentous changes made to the English common law trial practice by the public at that
time. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 386
(2d ed. I 936).
39. For example, the colony of Massachusetts Bay banned paid counsel in its
courts altogether. A COPPIE OF THE LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETS COLLONIE IN
NEW ENGLAND, 1641, clause 26, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 46, 50-51 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975). For a general
discussion of pre-Constitutional American criminal procedure, see Moglen, supra note
36, at I 090-94.
40. John M. Beattie, Scales ofJustice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal
Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REv. 221,223 (1991).
41. The intent of the privilege was to prevent implementation of inquisitorial legal
systems like those of the ecclesiastical courts and of the Star Chamber. In essence, the
privilege provides a barrier to state implementation of an oath system or any other legal
framework in which the accused would be required to assist the state in compiling
evidence of the guilt of the accused. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427
(1956); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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was unthinkable within the common law criminal system during this
period. 42
The traditional prohibition against counsel came into disfavor in the
United States, and jurisdictions began to abandon the prohibition,
primarily during the eighteenth century. 43 The presence of counsel in
courtroom proceedings changed the dynamics of trial procedure and
increased the potential applicability of the privilege against selfincrimination.44 As a practical matter, the increase in the use of
defense counsel was the impetus that brought the formal recognition and
practical application of the privilege together. 45
The addition of defense counsel changed the nature of trial proceedings by increasing the adversarial character of the system. 4 In an
effort to zealously represent their clients, defense counsel began to focus
on the "testing" of the prosecution's case and on narrowing the
evidentiary sources available to the state. 47 The result was a divergence
among the courts over whether the scope of the privilege included
compelled evidence production or exemplars. 48
B.

The Role of the Courts

The actual application of the privilege against self-incrimination has
been primarily the product of judicial construction. 49 The Court has
42. Moglen, supra note 36, at I 089.
43. See Beattie, supra note 40, at 226. Beattie found that the percentage of
defense counsel appearances grew from 2.1 % in the l 770's to 20.2% in 1786, and to
36.6% in 1795. Id. at 227 tbl. I.
44. Langbein, supra note 36, at I 054; see also Stephan Landsman, A BriefSurvey
of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1983).
45. See Langbein, supra note 36, at 1084; Moglen, supra note 36, at I 128-29.
46. Langbein, supra note 36, at I 070-71. For an analysis of the origin and growth
of the adversarial system, see Landsman, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. One legal scholar wrote that "[o]n these questions the authorities are in such
conflict that it is impossible to lay down any thoroughly established rule." JOHN E.
TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 151 (1952). Another interpreted the
state of the law to be such "that an accused person cannot claim his privilege, when
asked to rise or to uncover his face, [nor] the use of the personal effects of the accused
as evidence," but that an accused person cannot generally be compelled to go farther
than this. JOHN J. MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 436 (3d ed.
1924).
49. See id.; Lisa Tartallo, Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination: The Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to End its
Silence on the Rationale Behind the Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27 NEW
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generally focused on its interpretation of the history and rolicies which
constituted the impetus for the creation of the privilege. 5 Considering
the formal affinity shown for the right, both in English common law and
by the founders of the Constitution, one might expect an expansive
application of the privilege in United States courts. In fact, in early
court treatment of the privilege, a majority of the courts that recognized
the existence of a privilege 51 utilized an expansive interpretative
approach. 52 Still, a significant minority of early courts construed the
privilege narrowly to include only content-based communications.53
Further, Professor John Wigmore, in his first treatise on evidence,
strongly advocated the narrow "testimonial" interpretative approach. 54
In addressing the contradictory interpretations of the breadth of the
privilege, the modern Supreme Court has adhered to the more narrow
interpretation that the privilege against self-incrimination protects no

ENG. L. REV. 137 (1992).
50. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (the privilege is based
on an unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the choice between selfaccusation, perjury or contempt). The "core meaning" behind the privilege is the
avoidance of the "cruel trilemma," a term which has been used to denote the
impossibility of fairness within a legal system such as the Star Chamber. The defendant
in such a system had three options, none of which were palatable. If the defendant
remained silent, he would be punished for contempt. If he testified truthfully, the result
would be self-incrimination and potential conviction on the substantive charge. And, if
he testified falsely, he would be punished for perjury. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 595-96 (1990); Daniel J. Capra, Sobriety Tests and the Fifth Amendment, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 9, 1990, (Evidence) at 3.
51. Before the United States Supreme Court held in Malloy v. Hogan that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, several states allowed state prosecutors to comment on a
defendant's failure to testify and permitted state courts to instruct jurors that they could
draw inferences from a defendant's failure to testify. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947) (prosecutor comments), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (jury inferences), overruled by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. l (1964).
52. State courts tended to interpret the right expansively, prohibiting the state from
requiring of a defendant any act that might tend to incriminate him. See, e.g., Stokes
v. State, 64 Tenn. 619, 621 (1875) (trial court prohibited from requiring defendant to
place his foot in a pan of mud brought into court); Turman v. State, 95 S.W. 533 (1906)
(court cannot compel defendant to don a cap); Reyes v. Municipal Court, 41 P.R. 892
(1931) (court cannot compel defendant to dishevel his hair). Likewise, the Supreme
Court initially took a narrower view, holding, for example, that compelled production
of documents violated privilege against self-incrimination. Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).
53. See, e.g., People v. Gardner, 38 N.E. 1003 (N.Y. 1894); White v. State, 62
S.W. 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901); see also Magee v. State, 46 So. 529 (Miss. 1908)
(Police officers have the right to acquire information from prisoners, even by force, and
doing so does not violate privilege against self-incrimination).
54. JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE§ 2263, at 3123 (1904).
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more than testimonial communications. In Holt v. United States, 55 for
example, the Court held that compelling a prisoner to try on clothing in
court did not raise a self-incrimination issue. 56 Similarly, in Schmerber
v. California, 57 the Court ruled that a compelled blood sample did not
constitute testimony, and thus, no self-incrimination protection applied.58 The repeated references in both Holt and Schmerber to
Wigmore's treatise reflects the importance the Court placed on his
work. 59 In fact, Justice Black, in his Schmerber dissent, openly
criticized the Court for its over reliance on a single academic source and
the Court's adoption of the "testimony" concept. Justice Black
commented that even though "my admiration for Professor Wigmore's
scholarship is great, I regret to see the word he used to narrow the Fifth
Amendment protection play such a major part in any of this Court's
opinions."60
Subsequent Supreme Court consideration of self-incrimination cases
has continued to strictly limit the privilege to "testimony".61 Based on
the Court's belief that a verbal statement would almost always qualify
as testimony, and thus fall within the privilege, the Court did not
consider the testimony rule as a narrowing of the privilege. 62 However,
in reality, the Court's belief has not been supported by any court
decisions based on an issue of a compelled voice exemplar.
As a result, the state of the privilege against self-incrimination in
modem American courts has been interpreted by at least one scholar as

55. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
56. Id. at 252-53.
57. 384 U.S. 757 (I 966).
58. Id. at 760-65.
59. See id. In considering Professor Wigmore's "testimony" theory distinction of
the privilege, it is important to note his open disdain for the concept that selfincrimination should ever be protected against in modern society. Wigmore denoted the
privilege as "a relic of controversies and dangers which have disappeared" and argued
that an "innocent" person would never need to assert the privilege and that the guilty
should not be entitled to it. See John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5
HARV. L. REV. 71, 85-86 (1891).
60. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting).
61. "Testimony" has been defined as state compulsion of a defendant to disclose
or communicate information of facts that might serve as or lead to incriminating
evidence. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 20 I, 211 (1988).
62. Id. at 213-14.
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"empty of meaning."63 This conclusion seemingly goes too far in that
it ignores, for example, the effectiveness of the privilege in mandating
a grant of immunity to a witness from the state, prior to compelling the
witness to incriminate herself. 64 Still, the current application of the
privilege by courts is much more narrow than it was during the
nineteenth century. 65
C.

Modern Framework

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been
divided into five general components, "allowing (llnatural persons (2lto
prohibit the introduction in a criminal proceeding (3lof self-incriminating
disclosures (4lthat were obtained through 'compulsion' by the state and
5
66
( lthat are testimonial in nature."
The United States Supreme Court
has addressed, within a constitutional framework, each of these factors
and clarified how the factors must be applied. 67
Each of the first four factors will likely be satisfied in cases involving
compelled voice exemplars. An individual criminal defendant will
usually satisfy the first component per se. The Court has adhered to a
narrow definition of "person," allowing only natural persons to assert a
privilege against self-incrimination. 68 Still, any individual criminal
defendant, as a natural person, can assert a privilege. 69 The second
component, limiting the privilege to a criminal proceeding, has not been
as narrowly construed. The Supreme Court has found the privilege to
be applicable in any situation where incriminating testimony might be
revealed and subsequently used in future criminal proceedings. 70
Because the exemplar procedure occurs during trial, the exemplar portion
of a case will always fall within the "criminal proceeding" category.
63. George C. Thomas III, Justice O'Connor's Pragmatic View of Coerced Se!fIncrimination, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 117,117 (1991).
64. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
65. See MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 436; Synopsis, Privilege ofAccused Against
Corporal Examination, 16 HARV L. REV. 300, 300 (1903).
66. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS§§ 15.01-15.02, at 323-24 (2d ed. 1986).
67. For a complete discussion of the five factors, see Tartallo, supra note 49, at
144-50.
68. Thus, a corporation, association, or partnership cannot assert a privilege with
regard to the entity. Still, any individual member may assert his or her own privilege
on statements which might act to incriminate them as individuals. Id. at 144.
69. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege as
applicable only to the personal and private interests of individuals. United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). Thus, the privilege is limited to instances when an
individual person is being compelled to testify and when that testimony will incriminate
that person.
70. McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
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The third element of "incrimination" is a fact specific question, but
would be satisfied in the case of compelled exemplars, due to the broad
definition given to "incrimination." Testimony will be considered
incriminating whenever it might "furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute." 71 Fourth, in the case of exemplars, the "compulsion" component is satisfied as a matter of course, as the exemplar
situation arises only when the defendant is forced by the government
with the permission of the court72 to provide a voice exemplar.
Therefore, the fifth element of whether compelled evidence constitutes
testimony is the crucial determinant, and as such has been frequently
questioned. Based on the Supreme Court's adoption of the "testimony"
distinction, "acts" have generally not been held to fall within the scope
of the Fifth Amendment privilege. For example, courts have allowed a
defendant to be compelled to reenact a crime, 73 dye her hair, 74 furnish
a handwriting sample, 75 perform a sobriety field test, 76 wear an outfit
or costume77 and shave a beard or mustache. 78

71. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951).
72. Of course, if the defendant freely volunteers to offer an exemplar, without any
coercion or compulsion by the government, no constitutional right is implicated. See
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
73. E.g., Avery v. Procunier, 750 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1985) (forced
reenactment of a robbery at the crime scene upheld by appellate court as non-testimonial,
though the court discouraged such procedures).
74. E.g., United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2034 (1991 ).
75. E.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (I 967); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967).
76. The Supreme Court has held that compelled sobriety field tests are not barred
by Fifth Amendment protection. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592 (1990).
Because these tests do not infringe on a Fifth Amendment right, the suspect does not
have a constitutional right to refuse to perform the tests prescribed, so a defendant's
refusal to participate in such tests can be used against him in court. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560-61 (1983). Finally, the lack of constitutional protection
makes the requirement of providing Miranda warnings inapplicable. People v. Hager,
69 N.Y.2d 141, 142 (1987); see also Muniz, 496 U.S. at 583.
77. E.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910); United States v.
Walitwarangkul, 808 F.2d 1352, 1353 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Robertson, 19
F.3d 1318, 1322 (10th Cir. 1994).
78. E.g., United States v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Weir, 657 F.2d 1005, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 1981) (taking hair samples from beard).
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The courts faced a more difficult task in drawing a distinction between
compelled verbal evidence and constitutionally protected testimony. 79
In order for verbal communication to be considered testimonial, the
"communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual
assertion or disclose information"80 that expresses "the contents of [an
individual's] mind."81 With few exceptions,82 courts have held that
the forcing of repetition of phrases, either for identification purposes83
or to refresh a witness' memory, 84 does not constitute testimony
because the compelled recitation of words or phrases by the defendant
does not offer more than the physical evidence of the defendant's
voice. 85 Thus, under the current court treatment of the law, the
privilege against self-incrimination will generally be inapplicable to
compelled evidence, including exemplars. 86
Despite the extensive case law in this area, including multiple
Supreme Court rulings denying the applicability of self-incrimination to
compelled evidence, 87 defense counsel continue to challenge the current

79. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2265, at
396 (1961).
80. United States v. Doe, 487 U.S. 201,210 (1988).
81. Id. at 210 n.9.
82. See. e.g., United States v. Berberian, 767 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1985)
(defendant protected by privilege against self-incrimination from forced repetition of
testimony given in a prior suppression hearing); State v. Naylor, 70 Ohio App. 2d 233
(1980) (holding that the trial court's decision to force defendant in rape and burglary
trial to repeat certain key phrases used by perpetrators during commission of the crimes
was equivalent to compelling defendant to testify, and thus violated defendant's right
against self-incrimination).
83. E.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 7 (1973) (grand jury order forcing
suspects to record voice found not to be a violation of Fifth Amendment); United States
v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 249-51 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring defendant to repeat several
phrases heard by police at the scene of the crime so jury could compare voice to tape
recording not a Fifth Amendment violation because statements did not contain
testimonial content).
84. E.g., United States v. Silvestri, 790 F.2d 186, 189 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 857 (1986) (compelling defendant to identify himself to witness when witness
forgot defendant's name not violative of Fifth Amendment because no testimonial
content present within the statement).
85. The applicability of a self-incrimination protection claim to compelled voice
exemplars under the "testimony" standard has been realistically foreclosed by the United
States Supreme Court, which held that voice exemplars do not constitute testimony and
are not protected under self-incrimination. See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 7.
86. United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 991 (1983); But see Naylor, 70 Ohio App. 2d at 236-37 (trial court's decision to
force defendant in rape and burglary trial to repeat certain key phrases used by
perpetrators during commission of the crimes was equivalent to compelling defendant
to testify, and thus violated defendant's right against self-incrimination).
87. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245
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narrow formulation of the privilege. 88 To a lay person the assertion of
the privilege by counsel seems to be the clear and logical defense, based
on the lay person's perception that the state cannot force a defendant to
speak in court. 89 Further, the "testimony" limitation placed on Fifth
Amendment protection has not been universally supported, with staunch
and compelling criticisms of the limitation being asserted by prominent
Supreme Court Justices. 90
Potentially, the continued zealous efforts of defense counsel to allege
a self-incrimination violation will result in a reconsideration of the
judicially created limitation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Beyond this, a couple of recent decisions reflect the fringe areas of the
privilege that may still be asserted in the exemplar context. In
particular, there are two narrow exceptions to the general trend of
holding that the privilege against self-incrimination is inapplicable to
compelled evidence that may apply.
The most significant exception is in the situation where the act of
production of the evidence also acts as implicit testimony to an

(I 910).
88. See, e.g., Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial at 5-6,
United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.) (No. 91-1151-G), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 610 (1994); United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Flanagan, 34 F.3d 949 ( I 0th Cir. 1994).
89. Discussion of the topic of this article with non-legal peers was universally
responded to with the assertion that the exemplar was or should be protected by the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination privilege. The general expectation was that the court
could not force a defendant to say anything in court. While these discussions have no
statistical reliability, they seem to reflect a common belief that a defendant cannot be
forced to speak in court, regardless of technical legal standards which hold otherwise.
90. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774-76 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing both the lack
of clarity or precision that the "testimony" distinction provides, and the failure of the
Court to adhere to the broad and liberal construction that the Court had previously given
the self-incrimination privilege); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 33 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the word "testimony" is not included within the
Fifth Amendment, and addressing the invasion of personality and will that a compelled
voice exemplar accomplishes, stating that he could not "accept the notion that the
Government can compel a man to cooperate affirmatively in securing incriminating
evidence when that evidence could not be obtained without the cooperation of the
suspect"). "[ A voice exemplar] is the kind of volitional act-the kind of forced
cooperation by the accused-which is within the historical perimeter of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. Our history and tradition teach and command that
an accused may stand mute. The privilege means just that; not less than that." Wade,
388 U.S. at 260-61 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Allowing the State to force the
accused to repeat 'your money or your life' or words used in the commission of a
violent crime like rape is intolerable under our constitutional system. Id.
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incriminating fact. 91 For example, if the state compels the defendant
to produce her copy of her tax forms, despite already having a copy, the
state is using the defendant's production as implicit testimony of the
authenticity of the government's copy of the tax form. 92 Voice
exemplar situations in which the defendant is compelled to repeat words
in Spanish or another foreign language arguably fall within this
exception. 93
There is also support for the applicability of a Fifth Amendment
privilege in a situation where the court compels a person to submit to
testing, from which an effort will be made to determine physiological
responses through a person's ability to recall information. 94 For
example, police questioning of a suspected drunk driver, which included
a question regarding the year of suspect's sixth birthday, violated selfincrimination privilege because such a response proffers more than a
physiological exhibition. 95
The Court distinguished the birthday
question from other exemplar type situations on the basis of content.
The birthday question was interpreted by the Court, in Pennsylvania v.
Muniz, to be seeking the contents of the defendant's mind, requiring him
to provide communication of information. 96 This approach is particularly applicable to compelled in-court exemplars and should be argued
by defense counsel.97

91. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
92. Id.
93. Such exemplars seem to implicitly offer factual information, particularly the
proficiency of the defendant to pronounce foreign language terms. This occurrence
seems to fall within the standard the court applied in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582 (I 990). See infra note 94 and accompanying text. However, claims on this basis
have been disregarded by the courts to this point. See, e.g., United States v. Olvera, 30
F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994).
94. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
95. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582; see also Gordon E. Hunt, Fifth Amendment Limitations
on the Compelled Production of Evidence, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 811 (1987).
96. 496 U.S. at 598-600. The Court found this despite the obvious fact that the
defendant's answer to the birthday question was not the reason that the officers asked
the question. Neither the State nor the officers of the State cared when the defendant's
sixth birthday was; they were asking the question solely as a tool to test the cognitive
abilities of the defendant, just as they had with the other sobriety tests. Id.
97. It is difficult to reconcile the effect of the Pennsylvania v. Muniz distinction.
The Court has attempted to draw a bright line, protecting the conveyance of information,
but the rule ignores the dangers posed by the real results of the rule. A defendant has
constitutional protection from giving completely innocuous, irrelevant answers to
questions, but can be forced to repeat potentially inflammatory phrases in a courtroom.
This approach was recently rejected in the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Olvera, 30
F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). At trial, defense counsel
attempted to assert that the requirement that the defendant speak in two languages
constituted testimony, regardless of the content of the speech, by showing the
defendant's bilingual ability. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
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Thus, even though historically the application of the privilege was not
realistic, the Court's adoption of the blanket exclusion of exemplars from
self-incrimination protection seems to go too far. In particular, the
refusal to apply the privilege does not adequately recognize the actual
effect on jurors from observation of in-court statements by a defendant.
While some recent expansion of the privilege against self-incrimination
has occurred, the current formulation of the privilege allows the state to
compel profoundly incriminating evidence from the defendant. The state
benefits significantly in having access to this evidence because without
a narrow rule as to what constitutes self-incrimination the state would be
left to prosecute without access to many of the sophisticated evidence
sources available in the twentieth century. For example, if the Court had
retained the expansive view of the privilege, the state would have no
access to blood, fingerprints, DNA, hair, etc. These pieces of evidence
are some of the most definitive and reliable evidence sources available,
and without access to any of them the state would have difficulty
convicting in any case. Still, that benefit alone is not a constitutionally
valid basis for the "testimony" rule. Although, realistically, the benefits
were probably considered in the Court's decision to interpret the
privilege narrowly. Judicial motivations aside, within the relevant legal
framework in its current state, attempts to assert a self-incrimination
privilege in response to court demands for a voice exemplar will not
generally succeed.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES IN THE
CONTEXT OF COMPELLED EXEMPLARS

If the Supreme Court continues to narrow the privilege against selfincrimination, the next constitutional question is whether requiring
defendants to provide voice exemplars in the context of in-court
identification procedures violates due process guarantees. 98 Unlike
other rules of law, due process "is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."99 Instead,

Defendant's Motions at 7, United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.) (No. 911151-G), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 610 (1994).
98. See United States v. Basey, 613 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919
(I 979).
99. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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due process represents "a profound attitude of fairness between man and
man" and "is compounded of history, reason, the past course of
decisions and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic
faith." 100 While debate continues as to whether "due process" should
include substantive protections, 101 procedurally the guarantee generally
acts as a "catch-all" protection, limiting the government in favor of
private rights. 102 Of course, the scope of the protection tends not to
be fixed, but varies according to the personality and philosophy of the
Court at the time. 103
Because of the theoretical nature of due process, determination of its
applicability is fact specific and must be considered within the context
of the underlying right. Compelled exemplars must be considered within
the due process context of both the prohibition of overly suggestive
procedures and the preservation of the presumption of innocence.
Unlike the self-incrimination area, the circuit courts have split on the due
process question and the Supreme Court has declined its opportunities
to address the question directly. 104

A.

History

The guarantee of "due process of law" was first explicitly enumerated
in statutes enacted during one of a series of reaffirmations of the Magna
Carta during the fourteenth century. 105 No guidance was included
regarding the specific meaning of the due process guarantee, leaving the

Id. at 162-63.
Compare Rosalie B. Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of
Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1991) and Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (1990) with Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The
Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT 339 ( 1987); Timothy L. Raschke Shattuck,
Note, Justice Scalia 's Due Process Methodology: Examining Specific Traditions, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2743 (1992).
102. RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 593-94 (1973).
103. See VIRGINIA L. WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 1932-1949; THE SUPREME
COURT'S USE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL TOOL 272 (1951).
I 04. "The Supreme Court has not addressed the possible prejudicial effect of live
courtroom voice identification using threatening and vulgar language in the presence of
the jury. However, the circuits that have confronted the issue of a voice exemplar in the
jury's presence have allowed it." Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922,925 (5th Cir. 1993);
But see United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d I 195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610
(1994); United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1983).
I 05. "That no man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of Land
or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being
brought to Answer by Due Process of the Law." STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER OF THE
LIBERTIES OF LONDON, 28 Edward III, ch. iii, I Statutes of the Realm 345, ch. iii
(1354), printed in MOTT, supra note I 02, at 4 n.11.
100.
IO I.
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determination to judicial and scholarly interpretation. t06 The scope of
the right was primarily defined by Sir Edward Coke in the Institutes, to7
during the revival of the Magna Carta in the early seventeenth century.
Coke's writings had a tremendous influence on the afsplication of due
process up through the early eighteenth centu~f 8 While Coke
ascribed a substantive component to due process, 10 the actual application of due process in England in the colonial period was primarily in
the context of judicial procedure. 110
The concept of due process, along with many of the English legal
rights, was transplanted to America and formally guaranteed in charters
and documents of the early American colonies. 111 By the end of the
seventeenth century, most of the English colonies had included
guarantees of due process in their fundamental laws. i tz Many of the
procedural guarantees supported by the concept of due process were
explicitly enumerated within the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution. 113 Nonetheless, "due process" was explicitly included as
well, 114 alluding to a belief by the Founders in the importance of the
continued protection of individuals against a potentially tyrannical or
coercive government. Despite the "Anglophobia" prevalent in America
after the Revolution, American courts continued to rely heavily on
British precedents on issues of due process. 115 However, the courts did
not adhere rigidly to criminal due process precedent, but instead

106. One of the most influential interpretations of the guarantee's application in
England was made by Sir Edward Coke. Coke asserted that the terms "due process of
law" and "the law of the land" were synonymous. This meant that due process was to
include a trial's general conformity to the principles of common law, trial by jury by the
peerage and lawful indictment. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 53 (1642), reprinted in
MOTT, supra note I 02, at 77- 78.
]07. 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1642).
I 08. MOTT, supra note I 02, at 78-83.
109. Riggs, supra note IOI, at 959.
110. MOTT, supra note I 02, at 83.
111. The New York Charter of Libertyes and Privi/edges of 1683 protected colonists
by requiring "due Course of Law," while the I 692 Massachusetts Bay Declaration of
Righrs guaranteed "due process of law." Riggs, supra note 101, at 964-65.
112. Id. at 961.
113. For example, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a fair trial and
the right to trial by jury are all procedural guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
U.S. CONST. amends. V & VI.
114. U.S. CONST. amend V.
115. DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 53 (1992).
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attempted to respond to their perceptions of the needs of a free
society. 116 Overall, the focus of post-Revolutionary criminal law
shifted emphasis from morality to concern over the protection of
property and privacy. The courts' protection of procedural safeguards
were central in this shift and, in the process, established definitions of
due process that were readopted during the expansion of due process
doctrine in the mid-twentieth century. 117
The due process doctrine after the Civil War narrowed significantly,
formally recognized by the courts, but not generally applied in support
of the rights of individual defendants. JJS The progressive era movement for social justice ended this period, as courts and legislatures began
another redefinition of "due process." 119
The most significant example of this change in "due process" is
reflected by the United States Supreme Court decision in Powell v.
Alabama. 120 The Powell decision evidenced the Court's determination
to test individual criminal cases conducted in the state courts under due
process requirements and began the process of incorporating certain
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution as binding on the states. 121 This process continued
through the 1960's, when the selective incorporation doctrine was
adopted and used to essentially complete the nationalization of the Bill
of Rights. 122
B.

Modern Framework

As previously noted, the Supreme Court has not addressed the circuit
court dispute over a due process limitation on voice exemplars. This
failure is of particular concern, considering the influence this type of
evidence tends to have and the frequency of cases concerning compelled
evidence of this nature. 123 Due process consideration of compelled

I 16. "'We consider it our duty,' concluded the Indiana Supreme Court in 1822, 'to
give all weight to objections however nice and technical ... but we would guard against
the evil of giving too easy an ear to such as rest on mere form of words, and can have
no possible bearings on the merits of the case ... an evil which has long and justly been
complained of as a disease of the law."' Id. at 52.
117. Id. at 54-55.
118. Id.at91.
119. Id.
120. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
121. WOOD, supra note 103, at 267. Powell was the method by which the Court
opened the door to unlimited supervision of state criminal proceedings, a practice
followed regularly until 1946. Id. at 267-68.
122. BODENHAMER, supra note 115, at 104.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 881 (1981); United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
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exemplars includes two distinct, yet closely related factors, First, due
process provides protection against the tainting of a witness identification
by overly suggestive pre-trial and in-court procedures. Second, due
process acts to prevent the infringement on the presumption of innocence
to which the defendant is entitled.

1.

Suggestiveness of Identification Procedures
a.

Pre-Trial Procedures

The Court has addressed the tangential issue of "pre-trial suggestiveness" in the context of line-ups, and has attempted to define legal
standards for what is essentially a fact specific determination. The Court
originally addressed this issue in 1967 in Stovall v. Denno, 124 and
focused on the fairness of the identification procedure under the "totality
of the circumstances." 125 Soon after, the Court, in a series of cases
beginning with Neil v. Biggers, 126 retreated from this more stringent
fairness standard. Instead, the Court emphasized that the reliability of
the outcome was the central determinant, focusing on the primary
concern of the due process clause, which is to protect against "a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-identification." 127 The Biggers
Court did not provide a bright-line definition of "overly suggestive

479 U.S. 1038 (1987); United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, I 15
S. Ct. 610 (1994).
124. 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (acknowledged the validity ofan independent due process
suggestiveness claim, but found it inapplicable based on the trial record without
elaborating on the basis for the ruling).
125. Id. at 301-02.
126. 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (suggestive line-up at police station combined with a
seven month delay between incident and identification did not pose a substantial
likelihood of misidentification, based on the detailed description given by the witness
and other facts supporting the validity of the identification); see also Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (clarifying the central importance of misidentification
to the Biggers standard).
127. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
384 (1968)). The danger is best expressed by Justice Brennan, who notes that "[i]t is
a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the
[pre-trial] lineup, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the
issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all practicable
purposes be determined there and then, before the trial." United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218,229 (1967) (quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part
I, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 479,482 (1963)).
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procedures," but instead defined the standard vaguely, holding that the
central consideration in determining whether to exclude evidence as
violative of due process is whether "under the 'totality of the
circumstances' the identification was reliable, even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive." 128
The Court reaffirmed Biggers' focus on reliability as the central
determinant of admissibility in Manson v. Brathwaite, 129 and clarified
the test to be applied in analyzing whether a procedure was
impermissibly suggestive. 130 The "Biggers-Brathwaite" standard enacts
a two-step analysis. First, the defendant must prove that the identification procedure used was impermissibly suggestive. Second, if this
burden is met, the court must determine whether such suggestiveness
created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. This is
accomplished by balancing five enumerated factors that weigh in support
of the reliability of the identification against the suggestiveness of the
procedure. 131
b.

In-Court Procedures

The Supreme Court has not definitively addressed the applicability of
the Biggers-Brathwaite test to the question of in-court suggestive
identifications. 132 The majority position among the circuits that have
considered the issue has been that the Biggers-Brathwaite pre-trial
standard is not constitutionally mandated for in-court identifications. 133
Unlike pre-trial identification, in-court identifications occur in a
courtroom while the relevant witness is under oath, subject to cross-

128. Id. at 199.
129. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
130. Id. at 114.
131. The Brathwaite Court adopted five factors, first discussed in Biggers, as
elements in consideration ofreliability. These factors include: C11the witness' opportunity
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; C' 1the witness' degree of attention at the
time of the crime; c31the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal; C41the
witness' level of certainty when identifying the suspect at the confrontation; and csithe
length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors, the court
must weigh the "corrupting effect" of the suggestive identification. Id. at l l 4.
132. United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1038 (1987) ("[N]o holding of the Supreme Court nor of this circuit has
mandated such a requirement.").
133. Domina, 784 F.2d at 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038
(1987). The Domina court recognized that suggestiveness within the in-court
identification process might require court protection, but held that such protection was
within the court's discretion. Id. at 1369. The Domina court also noted that only the
Eleventh circuit had indicated that the Biggers standard applied to in-court identifications. Id. at 1368.
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examination, and while under close observation by the trier of fact. 134
The primary rationale behind the Biggers-Brathwaite test is to avoid the
danger of an irreparable misidentification being relied on by the trier of
fact. This danger is decreased significantly by the protections provided
by courtroom procedures and by the presence of the jury at the
procedure. The jury may consider the level of suggestiveness used as
a factor to consider in gauging the reliability of the witness. These
protections significantly decrease the danger of misidentification in the
in-court context without having to apply the Biggers-Brathwaite pre-trial
standard.
Even in those jurisdictions that recognize Biggers-Brathwaite as the
required test for suggestive in-court identification, 135 the severity of the
suggestiveness required to satisfy Biggers-Brathwaite leads to exclusion
only in the most egregious situations. 136 These courts concur with the
majority position that in-court procedures provide increased protection
against over-suggestiveness from pre-trial procedures. First, neither the
solitary presence of the defendant in the courtroom nor the prompting by
opposing counsel lends credibility to the accuracy or objectivity of a
witness' identification, and thus, neither issue poses a significant
danger. 137 Second, the defendant is protected because a witness
making in-court identifications does so under oath, in the presence of the
trier of fact, and while subject to cross examination. 138
Third, to
determine whether due process was violated, courts tend to consider all
other evidence offered by the government that substantiates the element
of identity, to assure that the proper identification was made. 139 As a
result, the trier of fact in an in-court identification, unlike in a pre-trial
procedure, is able to determine the appropriate level of reliability to be

134. See id. at 1368-69.
135. See, e.g., Code v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 1316, 1319 (I Ith Cir. 1984); State
v. Jason, 392 A.2d I 086, I 089-90 (Me. 1978).
136. See Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 261; Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due
Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. I (1992).
137. See United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1275 (5th Cir. 1991).
138. See Domina, 784 F.2d 1371-72.
139. The more collaborating evidence that is offered by the government, the less the
danger posed by in-court identification procedures. See United States v. Robertson, 19
F.3d 1318, 1323-24 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Davila, 964 F.2d 778, 782 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, I 13 S. Ct. 438 (1992).
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placed with the identifying witness' testimony, significantly reducing any
danger of suggestiveness that might have otherwise occurred. 140
In addition, appellate courts have noted that to decrease the level of
suggestiveness defense counsel may request leave to place defendant
elsewhere in the courtroom or to conduct an in-court lineup. 141 Of
course, the trial court's decision of such a request is entirely within that
court's discretion, 142 although at least one appellate court has encouraged the use of protective procedures when feasible to do so without
courtroom disruption. 143
Despite the many protections afforded by in-court procedures, some
aspects of in-court identifications pose unique and significant dangers to
a defendant's due process rights. For example, unlike out-of-court
lineups or other identification procedures, in-court identifications are
inherently suggestive by the mere fact that the defendant is sitting at the
defense table. The defendant is isolated from all other persons, as the
sole focus of the government's case, when the witness is asked to
identify the person she saw. 144 The nature of this situation increases
the danger of false identification of the defendant 145 and may tend to
misdirect the jury to overvalue untrustworthy testimony. 146 These
dangers are more striking in the context of voice exemplars, as only the
defendant is compelled to speak. This essentially guarantees that the
witness will identify the defendant regardless of the true accuracy of that
witness' recollection. The most significant protection from these dangers

140. United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1987).
141. United States v. Murdock, 928 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1991); But cf United
States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1981) (defense counsel's
replacement of the defendant with a different person at defense table without the
knowledge of the court in an attempt to increase the likelihood of faulty in-court witness
identification testimony was punishable as criminal contempt).
142. The trial court's decision is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. United
States v. McDonald, 441 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971).
143. United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 420-21 (3rd Cir. 1985) (while
allowing an in-court lineup would have been preferable, the trial court's refusal was not
an abuse of discretion requiring reversal).
144. The witness will likely look first to the defense table, where the defendant is
sitting in relative isolation. Thus, the usual physical setting of the courtroom may itself
provide a suggestive setting for the identification. United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d
1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 9 I 2 (1971 ).
145. United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1038 (1987).
146. Fredric D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 994
( 1977). However, problems of perception and memory play an even greater role in
producing inaccurate information than does the use of suggestive procedures, and these
cannot be overcome by cross-examination. Id.

372

Constitutional Framework

[VOL. 33: 349, I996]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

is the defendant's access to cross-examination, 147 but realistically this
right may not be enough to overcome the danger. Thus, continued
concern over the danger of in-court identification procedures is justified,
and courts should continue to minimize the dangers to the extent
possible, under both the relevant evidence rules and other protections
available within the discretion of the court. For example, courts could
avoid suggestiveness problems by simply requiring witness identification
of voice exemplars be conducted out-of-court. However, courts have
tended not to adopt such protective measures in the voice exemplar
context, nor have courts excluded other types of in-court identifications
on constitutionally based over-suggestiveness claims except in cases of
outrageous misconduct by the state. 148

2.

Presumption of Innocence

In essence, presumption of innocence is the constitutional guarantee
that the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty and
that the fact finding process must not taint this presumption. 149 While
the actual effect of a particular procedure on the jurors cannot necessarily be determined, the courts must apply close judicial scrutiny to
procedures that might cause "deleterious effects." 15° For example,
requiring a defendant wearing a ski mask and holding a toy gun to stand
up in court and shout "[g]ive me your money or I am going to blow you
up" would be inconsistent with the guarantee of a presumption of
innocence. 151 Presumption of innocence protection seeks to keep the
trier of fact from drawing suspicions or inferences from the defendant's

147. United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1372 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1038 (1987).
148. Compare State v. Jason, 392 A.2d 1086 (Me. 1978) (impermissibly suggestive
to arrange in-court line-up in the presence of five-year-old child prosecutrix, remove her
from the courtroom, and add defendant to line-up and then have prosecutor and court
personnel "pressure" her to identify "the man that did it") with United States v.
Murdock, 928 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1991) (non-detailed and inaccurate identifications by
three witnesses of the defendant were held to be reliable despite fact that defendant was
the only person at defense table and the only African-American in the courtroom).
149. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
150. Id. at 504.
151. United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d I 195, 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
610 (1994); United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
881 (1981) (Oakes, J., dissenting); United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1374 (9th
Cir 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987).
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arrest, indictment and presence in court, while reaching a legal
conclusion based solely on the relevant legal evidence offered at
trial. 152 Certain courtroom procedures have been found to violate the
presumption, including requiring a defendant to wear prison clothing at
trial, 153 shackling or gagging a defendant during trial without
cause, 154 deploying excessive security forces in the courtroom, 155
permitting members of the court to encourage a witness to identify the
perpetrator of a crime, 156 or allowing courtroom observers to wear antirape buttons during a rape trial. 157
Whether compelling a defendant to restate words heard at the scene
of the crime is unduly suggestive of guilt, and thus violative of the
presumption of innocence, continues to be disputed among the courts.
The most recent circuit court consideration of this issue was United
States v. Olvera, 158 in which the court held that voice exemplars in
general have the potential to violate due process, and that due process
was violated in that particular case. 159 The court emphasized that the
risk would be diminished substantially if neutral words were used. 160
The court also discussed the importance of providing the jury with a
clear explanation that the exemplar was necessary for identification and
had no other relevance. 161 In addition, the court noted that the defendant had exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, which
substantially increased the risk that the words the defendant had been
forced to speak would stand out in the jurors' memories and affect the
ultimate assessment of the defendant's culpability. 162 Finally, the court
stated that the failure of the government to ask the witness, after the
defendant's statement, whether the defendant was the same person,
152. John H. Wigmore, The Presumption ofInnocence in Criminal Cases, reprinted
in JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
559 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1898).
153. Felts v. Estelle, 875 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir. 1989).
154. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1970).
155. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986).
156. State v. Jason, 392 A.2d 1086, l 089 (Me. 1978).
157. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1990).
158. 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994).
159. Id.
160. Id. at I 197 (quoting United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987)).
161. Olvera, 30 F.2d at 1197. However, the Ninth Circuit court failed to address
the fact that the trial judge in Olvera gave a seemingly sufficient explanation to the jury,
immediately after the defendant's repetition of the phrases. The judge explained that the
defendant had not been forced to testify because his exemplars were not testimony and
were only for the purpose of witness recollection for identification purposes. Direct
Examination of Rosa Ybarra at 11-27 line 18 to 11-28 line 17, United States v. Olvera,
30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.) (No. 91-1151-G).
162. Olvera, 30 F.3d at 1197 (9th Cir.).
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further increased the prejudicial danger. 163 Without follow-up, the
defendant's statements may have appeared to the jury to be no more than
a demonstration of the defendant's commission of the robbery. 164
The Olvera decision forged into a rarely considered constitutional
territory by its acceptance of a presumption of innocence due process
claim for a compelled voice exemplar. Prior to Olvera, a substantial
majority of jurisdictions, including the Ninth Circuit, 165 had refused to
accept due process doctrine as a valid protection from compelled voice
exemplars. However, these rejected due process claims were argued on
suggestiveness grounds, not presumption of innocence. 166
While defense counsel should pursue a presumption of innocence
claim as a defense to compelled exemplars, the Olvera decision does not
provide a useful framework for the assertion. 167 The North Carolina
Court of Appeal, in State v. Locklear, 168 was the first court to consider
a presumption of innocence claim based on the factors emphasized in the
Olvera decision. The Locklear court ruled that no due process violation
occurred because the trial court had explained to the jury the reason for
requiring the defendant to repeat certain words and because the
prosecutor had asked the witness, after the defendant spoke, whether that
was the voice she had heard during the commission of the crime. 169

163. Id. at 1198.
164. Id.
165. United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
I 038 (1987); United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 912 (1971). The Ninth Circuit in Domina did allude to a presumption of innocence
claim, but disregarded the claim without explanation. Domina, 784 F.2d at 1371-72.
166. E.g., Domina, 784 F.2d 1361; United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981); United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1991).
167. The Olvera decision is not unique in this regard, The few courts that have
considered a presumption of innocence limitation to compelled exemplars have been
unable to set out a workable standard. For example, the Court of Appeal in Ohio found
a due process violation under facts mirroring the courtroom procedure used in Olvera.
State v. Naylor, 70 Ohio App. 2d 233 (1980), The court did so without any direct case
law in support of the due process issue. The only case law offered on due process was
a general cite to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) and Breithaupt v, Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), which set out the
infrequently applied "shocks the conscience" standard for due process. Id. at 23 7. In
essence, the Naylor court sought out and reached the correct result, but did so without
a clear legal framework.
168. 450 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
169. Id. at 518-19.
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Formalistically these differences may seem significant, but in actuality
the realistic difference in effect on the jury's perception of the
defendant's presumption of innocence is minimal. 170 The "almost
Kafka-esque" scene of a defendant being forced to repeat inflammatory
or threatening phrases will undermine the defendant's presumption of
innocence, regardless of the efforts made to "explain" the process. 171
By forcing the defendant to utter criminal statements in court, the court
isolates the defendant from all others in the courtroom and inevitably
associates the defendant with the charged conduct. 172 As a result, the
defendant is branded with "an unmistakable mark of guilt" in the jurors'
eyes.113
As previously discussed, defense counsel should continue to assert
presumption of innocence guarantees in their opposition to compelled
exemplars. However, they should also be aware that the Olvera
decision, while helpful and logically sound, is not fully effective in
securing due process rights. The Olvera decision focused on formal
procedural protections instead of basing the standard on a measure of the
actual effect of the procedure on the defendant. By some accounts, such
formalistic treatment of due process in the current United States legal
system has resulted in the negation of almost all of the protection that
due process was originally intended to provide. 174
Thus, the presumption of innocence implicit in the Due Process Clause
should clearly protect defendants from being compelled to repeat
inflammatory or emotionally charged words under the guise of witness
identification. 175 However, despite its logical application, defense
counsel will likely continue to face difficulty in expanding such

170. "The actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment of jurors cannot
always be fully determined. But this Court has left no doubt that the probability of
deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny." Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976).
171. See Jim Doyle, Judge's Order to Talk Leads to Reversal, S.F. CHRON., July
28, 1994, at A23.
172. United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
610 (1994).
173. Id. (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 571 (1986)).
174. Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 261.
175. There is no sound reason why a defendant should have to repeat the same
words heard at a crime scene in order for a witness to perform a voice identification.
See United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1038 ( I987) ("There is no doubt that it would have been a far better procedure to
have had Domina repeat neutral words . . . ."). This is particularly true of cases in
which prosecutors require an exemplar despite other available methods of identification.
E.g., State v. Locklear, 450 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). At minimum, the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari on this issue to provide protection against
potential prosecutorial manipulation.
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protection in the area of voice exemplars due to the reliance on formal
procedural safeguards to protect constitutional rights.
III.

OTHER POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE OPTIONS WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF COMPELLED EXEMPLARS

A.

Sixth Amendment Guarantees

The most significant area of Sixth Amendment applicability is in the
context of the absence of assistance of counsel. This problem generally
arises when a suspect is included in a pre-trial lineup for witness
identification purposes. 176 For example, the right to counsel is guaranteed for pre-trial lineups because of "the accused's inability effectively
to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred." 177 In general, the
determination of whether a Sixth Amendment constitutional violation has
occurred depends on the court's decision of whether the lack of counsel
occurred at a "critical" stage in the proceedings. 178
The Supreme Court has held that pre-trial production and testing of
physical evidence is generally not within the "critical stages" as defined
under the current standard. 179 The distinction that the Court makes
centers on whether a particular governmental action, taken with defense
counsel absent, might derogate from the defendant's right to a fair
trial. 180 Unlike out-of-court line-ups, the Court determined that only
a minimal risk was posed by pre-trial compelled physical evidence as the
adversarial nature of the trial system affords the defendant the opportunity to "correct" any unrepresentative sample. 181 Thus, in the Court's
view, the defendant's right to a fair trial is not jeopardized by the
176. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 271 (I 967); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967); Catherine A. Rivlin, Note, Showdown Over the
California Showup, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 135 (1983).
177. Wade, 388 U.S. 231-32.
178. Id. at 227.
179. Id. at 227-28; Gilbert, 388 U.S. 267 (1967).
180. Wade, 388 U.S. 228.
181. The accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the
Government's case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the
Government's expert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own experts.
Gilbert, 388 U.S. 267; Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28. Even though pre-trial identification
does not require presence of counsel, the admissibility of the evidence is still governed
by and subject to the due process standard. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91
(1972) (plurality opinion).
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absence of counsel in pre-trial production of physical evidence.
However, pre-trial voice exemplar production, if conducted like a
confrontational line-up, should be considered a critical stage for the same
reasons as line-ups in general. 182 The distinction is between a voice
exemplar merely recorded for later use and a witness identification of an
exemplar at that particular time and location. The former will be
allowed, just as any other taking of physical evidence; the latter probably
not.1s1
Defense counsel should argue that the compelling of a voice exemplar
from the defendant infringes on her right to effective assistance of
counsel in two ways. First, forcing a defendant to speak as part of the
state's case improperly makes the defendant a witness for the state.
Second, if the court finds that the exemplar can be compelled, defense
counsel should argue that a limiting instruction to the jury is a minimum
requirement to protect the defendant's right to effective counsel. Still,
as a general matter, this Sixth Amendment guarantee will not be a major
issue in the normal in-court compelled exemplar case since defense
counsel will be present to protect the defendant's rights at that time. 184

B.

Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy

The Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy protection has been applied
according to a court's determination of whether a reasonable person
would have an expectation of privacy against the particular state action
taken. 185 The central function of the Fourth Amendment is to "protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State." 186 The courts, primarily relying on Katz v. United States, 181

182. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
183. But see Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 784-85 (2nd Cir. 1981 ), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 948 (1982) (voice identification admissible at trial despite lack of the presence
of counsel during pre-trial interview); United States v. Depree, 553 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th
Cir.) (no right to counsel at pre-indictment voice identification), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
986 (1977).
184. The effectiveness of defense counsel may still be challenged under the standard
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), if the defendant can sustain
such a claim under the particular facts of the case.
I 85. This is a two-tier analysis. First, the court must determine whether the initial
"seizure" of the person by government agents satisfied constitutional standards. See
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). Second, any subsequent search or seizure
must be scrutinized under the relevant test. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968).
186. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
187. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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have attempted to draw the line between those aspects of the defendant
that are normally open to the public and those that are not. 188
Applicability of a Katz approach in a particular case is entirely fact
dependant, depending on the reasonable expectation of a privacy right
and the invasiveness of the particular state act in that case. 189 In
general, physical characteristics, and in particular voice exemplars, are
not protected because they are not private in nature. 190 Physical
characteristics are continually exposed to public observation, and no
expectation exists that others will not observe these features. 191 The
tone and manner of a person's voice, unlike the content of a conversation, is repeatedly produced for others to hear. 192 As such, courts have
deemed these to be merely identifying characteristics, not private aspects
of one's person. 193 In comparison, the taking of pubic hair samples or
of X-rays does infringe on an individual's legitimate expectations of
privacy and would thus be subject to Fourth Amendment requirements.194 Voice exemplars do not involve the level of intrusiveness
of these latter categories and should not be barred by federal Constitutional guarantees of privacy.
In a few states, however, protection has been afforded for voice
exemplars under a right to privacy guarantee under the particular state's

I 88. The essence of the distinction is the privacy expectation of an individual. See,
e.g., In Re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, Illinois Supreme Court v. Marquez, 604
N.E.2d 929,934,939 (Ill. 1992). Individuals do not have privacy expectations regarding
readily observable physical characteristics, but most individuals would have the
expectation that the taking of blood or hair invades their privacy. Id.; see also
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-69.
189. The extent of privacy guaranteed under the United States Constitution depends
on the particular facts of the case. Also, state constitutions may provide broader
protection of privacy, either explicitly or as interpreted by the state courts. For example,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Constitution is broader in scope than the
United States Constitution and guarantees a zone of personal privacy such that the taking
of physical samples from a suspect requires probable cause. May 1991 Will County
Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d at 934, 939.
190. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 9 (1973); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
191. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
192. "No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the
sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a
mystery to the world." Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14.
193. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1312 n.l (7th Cir.
1988).
194. E.g., United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341 (I Ith Cir.) (X-rays), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984); Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977) (pubic
hair).
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constitution. 195 If protected by the state's privacy guarantee, a subpoena based on probable cause to take such a sample would likely be
required. 196 Assertion of a privacy infringement claim by defense
counsel based on a compelled voice exemplar would have to be founded
in a state guarantee.
C.

Other Constitutional Approaches

Other constitutional approaches have been applied to compelled
production of voice exemplars and similar evidence, but have been
summarily disregarded. For example, one case turned on a claim by a
criminal defendant that requiring him to demonstrate his voice for
identification purposes would deny him his constitutional right to a
speedy trial; a claim that the court held was clearly without merit. 197
Likewise, a few cases have been considered under an equal protection
analysis, though none have resulted in the finding of a constitutional
violation. 198

D.

Non-Constitutional Protection

Outside of constitutional guarantees, state court evidentiary procedures
generally include a probative danger balancing standard which allows
trial judges, in their discretion, to balance the probative value against the
prejudicial danger of a particular piece of evidence. 199 Federal rules

195. See, e.g., supra note 185; CAL. CONST. art. I,§§ I, 24.
196. See In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, Illinois Supreme Court, 604
N.E.2d 929 (Ill. I 992).
197. State v. Cary, 230 A.2d 384, 394 (N.J. 1967).
198. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923,946 (9th Cir. 1966) (rejecting
defendant's argument that being required to participate in lineup and voice identification
denies equal protection, even though those defendants who can afford bail do not have
to participate), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967); Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420, 420-21
(9th Cir.) (requiring a suspect detained on a criminal charge to participate in a police
lineup and to speak for identification purposes did not violate the constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the law), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 922, reh 'g denied,
389 U.S. 893 (1967).
199. "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury." CAL. Evm. CODE§ 352 (West 1996); see, e.g.,
People v. Holt, 28 Cal. App. 3d 343, 104 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
921 (I 973) (trial court was within its discretion to exclude from evidence exhibition that
required defendant to stand, wear a hat, hold a gun and repeat the words uttered by the
robber under evidence code section 352) (disapproved on other grounds in Evans v.
Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 681, 114 Cal. Rptr.
121 (I 974)); State v. Miller, 467 P.2d 683, 685 (Or. Ct. App. I 970).
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provide essentially the same protection. 200
Of course, counsel should always consider a motion under the
applicable evidence code section to exclude compelled evidence and
exemplars, if such a claim can be reasonably made. Exemplar evidence
is not admissible as of right for either party, but is in the sound
discretion of the court to permit after considering the evidence's weight,
relevance, reliability, and the prejudicial danger that it poses. 201 As
such, success on a suppression motion based on the applicable rules of
evidence will depend on the particular facts of a case.
It would seem that a compelled voice exemplar situation would be
barred in many cases under the relevant evidence standards because the
production of a voice exemplar exposes the defendant to significant
prejudice. First, jurors are most likely going to consider the content of
the words spoken and weigh the statement as evidence, even if
admonished against doing so. In fact, the admonishment by the judge
might even reinforce and highlight the exemplar in the minds of some
of the jurors, resulting in still more consideration being given to it
during deliberations. Second, whether or not jurors consider the content,
the unusual nature of the exhibition, as compared to more mundane trial
practice, will likely result in the event receiving undue weight by the
jurors during deliberations and may result in impermissibly swaying their
decision, consciously or not. 202
In addition, in many cases no significant probative value is offered by
witness identifications of compelled exemplars. For example, in cases

200. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403. Many states, including
Colorado, Delaware, Utah and Hawaii, have adopted the text of rule 403 as enumerated.
See 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5211 n.31 (I 978 & Supp. 1995).
201. See People v. Williams, 559 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1990), ajf'd, 996 F.2d 1481
(2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. !073 (1994).
202. United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
6!0 (1994) (When defendant exercises the right not to testify, the only statements the
jurors hear from the defendant are those that mimic the words of a criminal during a
crime. "[T]hese statements thus are likely to remain prominent in jurors' memories and
to dominate their perception of the defendant."); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 50405 (1976) ("[T]he constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such
distinctive, identifiable attire [prison clothing] may affect a juror's judgment ... [and]
an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.").
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where alternative means of identification can and have been utilized, no
benefit at all seems to be gained by use of the exemplar process. Still,
courts retain the discretion to demand voice exemplars in such cases and
continue to demand exemplar production, despite the redundancy in
doing so. 203 Further, even in those cases where the probative value of
witness identifications is high, the requirement that the defendant mimic
the exact words used at the scene of the crime, instead of neutral words,
does not increase the probative value. 204
Thus, one might expect courts to routinely refuse prosecution requests
for in-court compelled voice exemplars under the relevant evidentiary
standard. Instead, courts often allow compelled exemplar evidence
unless an infringement of constitutional magnitude is shown, presumably
due to the misperception that all witness identification evidence has high
probative value. So, while assertion of an evidentiary claim is crucial
in the context of compelled exemplars, defense counsel must also focus
on drawing their case within constitutional protections if they want to
maximize their chances of avoiding a compelled voice exemplar. 205
CONCLUSION

The clear and logical application of constitutional limitations is
particularly crucial in the voice exemplar area because of both the
profound effects such exemplars can have on the jury and the lack of
effective non-constitutional protections against exemplars. Defense
counsel have multiple constitutional options to argue, but no clear
constitutional standard has yet been offered by the courts. Instead, most
potential protections, both constitutional and evidentiary, have been
drawn against the defendant in favor of the state, with the courts
favoring the interest of the state in incarcerating criminals over the
countervailing liberty interests of individuals. 206

203. E.g., State v. Locklear, 450 S.E.2d 516, 518 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (despite the
witness' statement that no voice exemplar was necessary, the trial court's demand that
the defendant provide an exemplar was still within its discretion); United States v.
Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 1987) (despite fact that witness had already identified
defendant, forcing defendant to repeat words uttered during the commission of the crime
did not violate defendant's rights).
204. See United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987) ("There is no doubt that it would have been a far better
procedure to have had Domina repeat neutral words .... ").
205. Also, by raising constitutionally based objections to the use of a voice
exemplar, defense counsel may convince the court not to allow the exemplar in a
discretionary ruling even if no constitutional bar is found by the court.
206. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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As long as the Supreme Court retains the testimony versus communication distinction, the privilege against self-incrimination offers little
protection in the area of compelled exemplars. The testimony standard
is open to criticism, but to this point has been steadfastly adhered to by
the courts.
Due process doctrine, on the other hand, should provide protection in
exemplar situations. Procedurally, current treatment of exemplars seems
to allow the state exemplar evidence that is denied to the defendant.
Substantively, the prejudice inherent in compelled exemplar scenarios
clearly has the potential to violate due process. 207 The Ninth Circuit
reached the correct result in its decision in Olvera, but the standard set
out by the court unduly emphasized formal procedural guidelines which
seem to minimize the real dangers to be avoided. Likewise, other courts
have generally relied on formalistic distinctions, ignoring the profound
prejudicial effect exemplars can have on jurors. As a result, counsel and
trial courts are left to continue to struggle with Due Process applicability
on a case by case basis until the Supreme Court grants certiorari on this
issue.
MICHAEL A. CONNOR

207.
(1994).

United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610
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